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ADDRESS OF BRIG. GEN. STROM THURMOND, USAR, BEFORE THE CONNECTICUT 
CAMG UNITS, ARMY TRAINING CENTER , NEw HAVEN, CONl~F: CTICUT ~ FRIDAY, 
JANUARY 24, 1958, 8:00 P.M. 
CAMG AND rl'HE PROBLEM OF SURVIVAL 
COMMANDERS AND MEMBERS OF CAMG UNITS IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT AND 
OTHER FRIENDS: 
I am delighted to be in the great State of Connecticut on this 
occasion. I consider it most fortunate that this opportunity has 
arisen for us to meet together. This occasion makes it possible for 
us to share our views on what is perhaps the chief problem of our 
times. Toward the solution of this problem, you have important tasks 
to perform in the conduct of your Civil Affairs and Military 
Government operations. 
I believe it can be stated without exaggeration that the chief 
intellectual problem confronting mankind, in this mid-decade of the 
twentieth century, is the problem of survival. 
In the solution of this problem of survival, the precise techni­
cal knowledge of the physical sciences is essential, but also 
necessary is the less precise knowledge of the social sciences, the 
knQwledge of the ways of man in his individual and collective life, 
the knowledge which study and experience will give you in the fields 
of economics, government, administration, public relations and 
services. 
Above and beyond this mundane knowledge, you will require that 
quality which only the Supreme Being can give you, but which you will 
acquire only when your minds and hearts are open to its influx: wisdom. 
In order to open my message to you, I would like your permission 
to quote freely from the first chapter of the Second Book of 
Chronicles: 
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"Solomon the son of David established himself 
in his kingdo m, and the Lord his God was with him 
and made him exceedingly great ••o 
"God appeared to Solomon, and said to him, 
9 Ask what I shall give you. 9 
11 And Solomon said to God, 9 •••Give me wisdom 
and knowledge ••• v 
"God answered Solomon, 9 Because this was in 
your heart, and you have not asked possessions, 
wealth, honor, or the life of those who hate you, 
and have not even asked long life, but have asked 
wisdom and knowledge for yourself that you may rule 
my people over whom I have made you king, wisdom 
and knowledge are granted youoo• 9 " 
(Second Chronicle 1:1-12 RSV) 
As CAMG officers, you, too, like Solomon, have need of wisdom 
and knowledge, in order that you may wisely and skillfully perform 
your tasks in the government of people over whom your commander may 
be placed by appropriate authority. 
Thus, it has ever been in all the ages since Solomon's time, Man 
has been seeking and gaining wisdom and knowledge. Modern science is 
a collation of that accumulated wisdom and knowledge. To paraphrase 
Will Durant in his introduction to The Story of Philosophy, science is 
useful for two purposes~ To Heal and To Harm. 
To Heal -- Science has overcome poverty, disease, and distress, 
to give us a standard of living, in terms of quality and abundance, 
and a length of healthful living, greater than all who came before us. 
Corollary to this, we have developed codes of conduct, of personal 
liberty, of protection of the individual from the mass. I could with 
enthusiasm devote my entire time to unfolding the magnificent scope 
of this purpose of science. However, permit me to pass on now to the 
other purpose of science. 
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To Harm - Science has conceived diabolical means for the waging 
of war. So vast have been the accomplishments in this regard that 
they seem to overshadow the saner gains I previously mentioned. I do 
not feel that I need to specify more than this, because you, by virtue 
of your membership in a Civil Affairs and Military Government organi­
zation, are fully aware that survival has become the overriding 
problem of our age and of our civilization. 
Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, whom President Eisenhower recently selected as Special 
Assistant in the area of Science and Technology, stated in an address 
in 1955: 
"Survival as an intellectual problem, however, involves 
a great deal more than military strength. It involves the 
maintenance of a society strong in its economy, its will, 
its confidence, and its moral purpose • .It requires a pre­
occupation with those matters of the mind and spirit which 
give a society coherence and its people courage and stamina. 
It involves freedom of thought along with freedom for each 
man to realize his fullest potential. Survival involves the 
cultivation of a core of human excellence and integrity that 
can stand unafraid and unbowed before the prospect of horror 
and catastrophe." 
This statement of Dr. Killian may be readily adopted and 
incorporated as part of a code of CAMG conduct. Bear in mind ever 
that in your conduct of CAMG operations, the reconstruction and 
"maintenance of a society strong in its economy, its will, its confi­
dence, and its moral purpose" and the "preoccupation with those 
matters of mind and spirit" are among the primary tasks given to you. 
As CAMG officers, your business is conducted in a milieu of 
social disorganization, in the midst of the human and material 
destruction which warfare brings. In the service of humanity, your 
contribution to survival "involves the cultivation of a core of human 
excellence and integrity that can stand unafraid and unbowed before 
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the prospect of horror and catastropheo" 
In a more mundane sense, as CAMG personnel, you are con cerned with 
the problems of survival, first in terms of winning the war, then in 
terms of winning the peace that must inevitably follow. 
In employing techniques for controlling the people, economy and 
governmental agencies, in areas where military forces of the United 
States engage in active combat operations, and in employing methods 
for handling problems of military-civil relationships, both in peace­
time and in wartime, you have a complex mission in which is involved 
the survival of humanity. 
Let us not forget that your first objective is to promote combat-· ­
to further military operations. This is accomplished by exploiting 
the civil potential and by preventing civilian interference with the 
military effort .. 
In a larger sense, the CAMG organization constitutes an instru­
ment for implementing the foreign policy of our country and for 
assuring that the conditions of international law and agreements are 
observedo 
While you must remember that it is with these matters you are 
primarily concerned, both in peacetime and in wartime, you have 
another task which is at the very core of the problem of survival that 
have mentioned. 
You have the task of reestablishing public order and safety out 
of the social chaos and disorganization which warfare engenders, of 
preparing occupied areas for a reconstituted, economically stable, 
representative form of government, and for the transfer of the area 
to acceptable civilian control. 
This latter task arises out of the very nature of warfare. To 
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achieve combat success, the military commander must destroy the enemy 
and this includes the combat elements, the resources mobilized in 
their support, and the political agency which directs the effort 
against him. Consequently, it is axiomatic to say that destruction 
is essential to winning a war. 
Karl von Clauswitz, in his 19th century work ON WAR, has stated, 
"War is an act of force and to the application of that force there is 
no limit.Ii However, after the experiences during World War II with 
V-2 bombs in England, buzz bombs in Belgium, "block-busters" in 
Germany, and atomic bombs in Japan, reason dictates that force must 
be applied with discrimination ~ Destruction must be measured and it 
must be limited to the actual requirements of the hour. Hence, 
contrary to the views of those who advance massive strategic retalia­
tion proposals of mutual annihilation, the force applied need not 
necessarily be massive, neither need the destruction be total~ 
We may recognize that conflict between nations has many aspects, 
planes or dimensionso First, and foremost is the plane of the spirit, 
sometimes suggested by the expression, "The battle for men's minds,n 
and in which we may, in a most liberal sense, include Cold War 
techniques, diplomacy, international cooperation, technological com­
petition, economic and psychological warfare, and similar engagements 
in peace and war time, though in peacetime the effort is often regarded 
as "short of war." Be that as it may, in war time there are three 
primary planes which may be identified as overland, overseas, and, if 
I may be permitted to coin a term, "overair." 
Throughout the ages, overland has been the traditional plane of 
warfare. To destroy an enemy, he must be engaged in his own plane of 
existence. He may be weakened elsewhere by consumption, but he can 
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only be defeated when his plane of existence has been entered. 
Consider the overseas techniques of the Norsemen. Their 
belligerent excursions out of Scandinavia found them in places where­
ever water could carry them. The Vikings sailed westward to Britain 
and the other islands of the North Atlantic, even to Iceland, Green­
land, and these shores of New England, not far from where we are now 
assembled. Southward, the Normans raided along the coasts of France 
and the Iberian peninsula to the African kingdoms on the shores of 
the Mediterranean, penetrating inland wherever rivers or streams 
would accept their boats. Eastward, the Swedish Varangians extended 
their sway over the Baltic to Novgorod, and southward throughout 
Kievan Russia, traversing the inland waterways of the Dvina, Dnieper, 
and Volga Rivers that took them from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea 
and on to Constantinople. 
Overseas techniques have been considerably improved, of coursep 
since the days of the Vikings. Yet, as with the Vikings, the efforts 
of their modern counterparts in overseas warfare were effective in 
winning victory only when followed by overland operations. 
Such a conclusion may also be reached with regard to overair 
techniques. In medieval times, the use of projectiles had considera­
bly displaced the Roman emphasis upon the footsoldier~ though for a 
time the horseborne soldier seemed to acquire some of the speed and 
travel characteristics of projectiles, although not exactly their 
overair features. However, such techniques were soon neutralized by 
development of fortified places, with wide and deep moats that neither 
projectiles nor cavalry could invest. 
Again, there was a recognition that only by overland techniques 
could an enemy finally be defeated. Then, the overair projectile 
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became an adjunct to overland operations, as may be seen in a study 
of the wars of the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years War c.nd the 
wars of Louis XIV, and later the campaigns of Napoleon and the wars 
of the nineteenth century. 
The perspective of the present and its projection into the future 
can not be clearly prophetic without illuminating it with the light of 
recollection. Military science, however much it may seem to be 
distorted by marvelous developments in the physical sciences, is still 
based upon a study of military history. 
Modern overair techniques have been spectacular, whether we 
consider the artillery and aircraft in both world wars or the develo p­
ment of piloted jet propelled aircraft and guided missiles sincea 
However, it is significant that throughout military history, the 
effectiveness of overair techniques ha7e always been neutralized by 
barriers or counteracting aggressive means. Essentially, this is the 
purpose of the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line. 
As in the case of overseas techniques, so in the case of overair 
techniques, they must be followed by overland techniques if the war 
is to be brought to a successful conclusion& The example of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be regarded by some as prophetic of the 
capability of modern overair techniques to bring wars to an end. Be 
that as it may, the novelty of the atomic weapon used, as well as the 
psychological shock of horror that its use induced, had as much to do 
with its effect as did its efficiency, Today, however, after over a 
dozen years of familiarity with atomic explosions, the novelty has 
worn off. 
Atomic weapons are becoming as much conventional in this late 
twentieth century period as any other weapons. The aim of weapons 
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is to remove an enemy 9 s capability to resist or inflict harm. This 
may be accomplished by destruction, by inducing starvation, by 
weakening the will or spirit, among many other ways. 
The Communists have clearly shown that they regard a club as 
sufficient in some cases as a hydrogen bomb or long range projectile 
is in other cases. The diversity of weapons, from the simplest to 
the most complex, which the Communists have available for ready and 
immediate use, discloses the pattern for future war which the 
Communists anticipate. 
Just last December, at the Convention of the Military Governmen~ 
Association in Boston, Mr. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army r 
stated: "It would be tragic indeed if, in concentrating our efforts 
in the field of long-range missiles and defenses against them, we 
neglected what may well be the greatest threat of all. This is the 
threat of huge Communist ground armies having conventional means of 
war." 
One thing is certain. Regardless of whether the arrival of CAMG 
elements in an area may be by overland, overseas, or overair means, 
CAMG operations are contingent upon the continuance of the use of 
overland techniques. CAMG operations are corollary to overland 
operations where civil populations are involved. It may almost be 
said: "No people, No CAMG." Overseas and overair techniques are not 
likely to involve people to be controlled or protected, unless followed 
by overland operations. 
It is also certain that from the moment the infantry first 
penetrates enemy-held territory, the commander is an occupier under 
the terms of international law. Consequently, the application of 
force, previously mentioned, even such controlled force as is required 
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to wi n a war, has a tremendous effect upon the civil population ••• 
and the reaction of that population, in turn, can have a tremendous 
eff ect upon the commander 9 s ability to cont i nue the applica~~on of 
the required force. 
It can be seen, then, that the commander 9 s decisions are influ­
enced not only by his own and the enemy 9 s relative combat power, but 
also by the civil characteristics of the area of combat operations. 
In his estimates of the situation, the commander carefully weighs 
civil affairs and military government factors along with those dealing 
with personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics. The Depart­
ment of the Army has clearly established this procedure in its 
principal field manuals for commanders and their staff officers, and 
has confirmed it by the establishment of a fifth general staff section 
in the headquarters of Army organizations. 
Furthermore, to the traditional two primary factors influencing 
the tactical commander's decision as to his courses of action in 
combat operations, there has been added a third factor. In the past, 
weather and terrain were the two factors affecting decision. The 
current edition of FM 100-5, Operations, which is the text of United 
States Army concept of military science, states that there is a third 
factor, civil conditions, namely, the political, economic, and 
sociological characteristics of the area of operations, which FM 101-5, 
Staff Procedures, sets out as the concern of the CAMG officer, the G5. 
The Assistant Chief of Staff G5 is responsible to the commander 
for all matters pertaining to the government, economy, civil population 
and institutions in the area where United States Armed Forces are 
employed. It is his job to assure that CAMG planning is constant, 
continuous, and in full coordination with all other planning in order 
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that CAMG operations may best contribute to the overall mission of 
the commander, first and foremost. In addition, the G5 must assure 
that CAMG planning accomplishes two other important objectives, among 
others: .2.!lli, To ensure CAMG support of tactical and logistical 
operations; and two, To resolve the civilian problems which handicap 
or interfere with tactical and logistical operations. 
There is a tendency upon the part of some people to believe that 
the technological peculiarities of weapons developed since World War 
II will induce radical changes in the aims of warfare. However, I 
conservatively submit to you that Clauswitz 9 summation of the overalJ. 
objectives of warfare are equally valid for nuclear warfare. 
These objectives of warfare are threefold: ~, to conquer and 
destroy the armed power of the enemy; two, to take possession of his 
material and other source of strength; and three, to gain public 
support. These objectives are inherent in the mission of the Army, 
which is~ "To defeat the enemy forces in land combat and gain control 
of the land and its people." 
It is evident that modern nuclear weapons and highly technical 
military forces will require mobilization of the full industrial and 
resource potential of a nation involved in war. It is evident, also, 
that the threat alone of the use of nuclear devices affects not only 
whole nations but international balances as well. Consequently, under 
such conditions, it is even more evident that the combat commander must 
conduct his operations with full recognition of the effect upon the 
population involved and their political, economic and governmental 
structures, if ultimate victory is, in fact, to be achieved. 
As we look ahead to the atomic age, we see in the combat 
commander 9 s mission new elements introduced, deriving from the vast 
numbers of human beings affected by the extent and the intensity of 
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his operations when nuclear weapons are used. 
Meeting such conditions den,ands the development and use of the 
most. efficient CAMG organization which can be devised, an organization 
in which are inherent two of the characteristics implicit in organi­
zation for nuclear warfare: ~, balance and flexibility, which 
recognizes the essentiality of the Army in gaining post war objectives 
and places greater reliance on air transportability; and ~!ill, 
continuing need for conventional forces, which means that while being 
relentless in the search to insure maximum combat effectiveness, it 
is necessary to be prepared to cope with aggression of any kind, at 
any time, at any place. 
In this respect, it is significant to note that current CAMG 
doctrine is adaptable to the requirements of the atomic age battle­
field. It is not old; it has emerged since World War II, and is 
derived from the lessons of military history. Four basic character­
istics of this CAMG doctrine are: 
One, CAMG units are the flexible cellular type, which can be 
tailor-made with CAMG functional specialists and CAMG officers 
necessary to meet the requirements of the area in which deployed, of 
any size battle unit, and of any type of transportation, including 
airborne. 
Two, CAMG units, specially trained for both overland and airborne 
field operations under combat conditions, are assigned to divisions, 
corps, and field armies to give CAMG support to the commands 
Three, In a mobile or unsettled situation, decentralization of 
command authority ("Operational Chain of Command") over all CAMG units, 
supplementary to those CAMG units providing direct support of combat, 
assures that the demands of dispersal can be met. 
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Four, A necessary aid to battle units operating over extended 
areas fer prolonged periods is t he primary function of CAMG opzrations.s 
to insure maximum utilization of the resources of the area for the 
support of the combat forces. 
While we tend to give greater attention to CAMG operations in 
foreign lands, we may be forgiven because that has been the historical 
projection of our work. However, we must not disregard the domestic 
projection, as a foreign enemy might attempt to attack us here in 
the United States& In view of this, we must not exclude from our 
consideration that CAMG combat support may be required in an area 
where the local population is not foreign but American. 
We are all aware that in time of disaster, the Army has always 
provided a reservoir of strength, aid and comfort for American 
communities. In the event of enemy attack, it can be expected that 
the Army, in addition to resisting the attack, may also be called upon 
to assist in Civil Defense and in providing essential public servicesc 
Against this contingency, it is of considerable urgency to 
national defense for the Army to have, both on active duty and in 
reserve status, a CAMG capability, alive and vital, to have trained 
a~d immediately available CAMG personnel capable of providing the 
skills and leadership ability that times of crisis would demand. 
Survival, which I mentioned earlier, is very much involved; in 
this case, national survival. For this reason, it is of primary 
importance not only to have available the CAMG organization, as such, 
but also to have the technological and professional competence of CAMG 
personnel brought to peak efficiency. 
There must be a continuing research program, in order to develop 
new techniques, procedures, testing criteria, and detection of new 
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research areas. The training of CAMG personnel must give emphasis 
to such subjects as the role of CAMG i n combat operations; clevelopment 
of plans, orders and annexes: problem solving methods and techniquesp 
cultural and environmental factors affectine the relationship between 
our military and the local governments and peoples; and procedures 
for allocating manpower and resources. 
There must be a full realization on the part of all military 
commanders of the CAMG capability, in assuring the accomplishment of 
his missions. In this connection, military personnel throughout the 
services must be indoctrinated in CAMG capabilities, in order to 
provide the balanced force needed. The operational nature of CAMG 
activities, the G3-G5 relationship, must be fully understood. In 
addition, CAMG plans, units and staff sections must be included in 
all maneuvers and CPX 9 s, in order that organizational and doctrinal 
developments may provide the combat commander of the future with 
a tested capability to handle his CAMG responsibilities. 
With the chaotic conditions envisioned in atomic age warfare, 
the commander's ability to handle the multitudinous problems -­
technological, ideological, logistical -- posed by civil conditions 
and the population among whom he is operating, may well spell the 
difference between his success or failure. 
Whether the commander is operating in a domestic or a foreign 
area, the paramount problem will be survival. This will be true, 
whether it is national survival or the sur1 ival of mankind. 
-END-
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